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C O M M E N T A R Y
PM & his NSA
Manmohan Singh should task his next national security advisor in a manner not to upset his cabinet colleagues, says N.V.Subramanian.
20 January 2010: When this writer wrote two pieces earlier this month seeking a new NSA ("A new NSA?" 4 January 2010 and "Terrorism & bunglers," 8 January 2010),
he had little idea that the issue was in the works, since it would be presumptuous to assume that the above-cited commentaries played any role in M.K.Narayanan's
present exit from that post. But there was also a call in those writings to review the functions and tasks of the national security advisor, and media reports suggest
that such a review is underway, although the prime minister, Manmohan Singh, apparently does not wish immediately to rearrange the existing architecture.
The PM's compulsion is understandable. No prime minister wants sudden, disruptive changes in his intimate secretariat. At least as the previous prime minister,
A.B.Vajpayee, had conceived the NSA post, he was to advance the PM's vision in national security, and be the PM's eyes and ears on it, which among other things
entailed coordination with the ministries of home, external affairs and defence, while at the same time administrating strategic policy- and decision-making (including
works related to the Department of Atomic Energy) which were directly under prime-ministerial control and purview. To be sure, Vajpayee had highly individualistic,
ambitious and powerful home, defence and foreign ministers, but because of his NSA, Brajesh Mishra's closeness to him, who also doubled as his principal
secretary, there was enough on the NSA's plate, without the need to undercut the top three cabinet ministers, although that unavoidably happened sometimes.
From what little one knows and understands of the Manmohan Singh set-up, and being aware of Narayanan's background and proximity to 10 Janpath, it is
reasonable to assume that the PM and NSA couldn't have been as close as Mishra was to Vajpayee. There is also the fact that Vajpayee was his own prime minister,
with considerable (if not absolute) control over the selection of his senior cabinet colleagues. The same cannot be said in all honesty about the present dispensation,
with Sonia Gandhi having a definite and broad say in top-level appointments. This should have allowed Narayanan, a seasoned bureaucratic infighter, to poach on
cabinet turfs and accumulate power, as Henry Kissinger did in his heydays as Richard Nixon's NSA (the parallels between the two cease there), and Narayanan
would have been assisted by a weak home minister till 26/ 11 (Shivraj Patil) and the appointment of a clueless S.M.Krishna as foreign minister after Pranab Mukherjee
moved to finance. Narayanan did another thing, bringing the foreign intelligence and security services under his charge, and becoming Manmohan Singh's
intelligence czar, and the intelligence filter for the PM. Up to now, at least, the PM has shown no marked interest in national security affairs, and this suited
Narayanan's ambitions perfectly, until P.Chidambaram landed the home job, post 26/ 11, where he has acquitted himself creditably. It is pointless to focus on the
friction between Chidambaram and Narayanan, because that is in the past and the NSA is moving out, but Chidambaram's plans for an all-inclusive internal-security
ministry should be reviewed, if only to get a clear picture of the NSA's future role.
Chidambaram has been sold on the US model of a national counter-terrorism centre, although that failed to detect the Nigerian Christmas-Day bomber who almost
succeeded in exploding a jetliner over American skies. Analysis is the key, and countries always fail on timely analysis (connecting the dots, as they say). But
insofar as they concern internal security, that is Chidambaram's bailiwick, and another commentary will hopefully address the issue. Pertinent to the NSA's role is the
intelligence reporting, which is solely to Narayanan now, and which function Chidambaram wants to take over. This writer has already expressed his opposition to
this in the first of the two NSA write-ups, for the simple fact that at no time must the prime minister be cut off from direct access to intelligence. By all means the
counterterrorism aspects of intelligence can directly be fed to Chidambaram, but that and the remaining intelligence (which is considerable) must go directly to the
prime minister. By effectively taking charge of IB and R&AW, Narayanan destroyed their independence and initiative and blunted their core skills (besides burdening
them with mediocre leaderships). The PM must take direct charge of IB and R&AW, and have them report to him daily, either at the beginning or at the end of the day
or at both times. If the PM is pressed for time (as he is always bound to be), he can temporarily depute perhaps his principal secretary to handle the less sensitive
intelligence briefings, but on no account should his NSA (like Narayanan now) be permanently charged with this task (nor the home minister, with no disrespect
meant to Chidambaram). No intelligence cliques should be allowed to emerge in the government, because it will ultimately rebound on the country's security.
Now to the NSA's role. As mentioned in the earlier two NSA-specific commentaries, the job is evolving in India, as it is in the US, although the United States
commenced the trend of having national security advisors way back in the Nineteen-Fifties. From Vajpayee's and numerous American examples, it is also clear that
the NSA must have the PM's complete trust. Narayanan, as far as one knows about this government, was not Manmohan Singh's appointee. But the next NSA must
be. The accent is on the next NSA being a former diplomat (some names have been mentioned in the press as this piece is written) to further the PM's foreign-policy
goals, but this is the classical wrong way to approach the issue. The PM would understand that his most important colleague to push forward his foreign-policy
initiatives or vision is his foreign minister, who is specially tasked for such a role with a professional foreign-service cadre backing him. Because S.M.Krishna is
wanting in this department does not mean you put an NSA for all purposes if not designation-wise above him. That would not only demoralize Krishna to total
ineffectuality but bring resentments to a boil in the foreign service and undermine the foreign secretary. If Krishna is no good, he should be replaced. Where there are
particular and great foreign relations' sensitivities involved, there the NSA can double as the PM's special emissary, a job that Mishra often did for Vajpayee. The
point is Manmohan Singh should strive to have super-competent ministers like Pranab Mukherjee and P.Chidambaram in his cabinet, and that goes for the foreign
office too, and the NSA's job then becomes to be a grand coordinator who can also work the interstices to the PM's advantage.
It is clear that diplomatic and coordination skills are essential for an NSA, plus he must have a clear and sound grasp of deterrence issues, which Narayanan,
unfortunately, did not have. Indeed, with non-proliferation pressures on India expected to increase in the short-to-medium term, any future NSA has to have robust
understanding of and insights into these issues, as too of the vast, labyrinthine and critical realm of strategic weapons' management. If a decision on deferring
appointment of the next NSA is taken, until the most suitable candidate is found, that would be entirely understandable. But if that is not possible, Manmohan Singh
must not make the same mistake as he did in appointing M.K.Narayanan. Narayanan never inspired respect as NSA, and this should not assume the contours of a
legacy.
N.V.Subramanian is Editor, www.NewsInsight.net, and writes internationally on strategic affairs. He has authored two novels, University of Love (Writers Workshop,
Calcutta) and Courtesan of Storms
(Har-Anand, Delhi).
Please visit N.V.Subramanian's blog http://courtesanofstorms.blog.com/ and
write to him at envysub@gmail.com
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