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C O M M E N T A R Y
Act up
The death of Hakimullah Mehsud shows a way against the Af-Pak terrorists, says N.V.Subramanian.
1 February 2010: Post the London conference on Afghanistan, it may be too late to resurrect the lost cause of fighting the Al-Qaeda/ Afghan Taliban/ Haqqani network in Pakistan's badlands, but one incident of last week does merit a reexamination of this. That incident is the death of the Tehreek-e-Taliban (TeT) or Pakistan Taliban leader, Hakimullah Mehsud, from a US drone attack.
Hakimullah has died (TeT won't confirm but PTV has quoted locals in South Waziristan on this) much in the same manner that his predecessor, Baitullah Mehsud, was killed, but the circumstances leading to their targeted assassinations are different.
Baitullah was attacked by US drones at the express request of Pakistan in August 2009 because of TeT's rising terrorism within the country. Baitullah was also alleged to have ordered the assassination of the former Pakistan prime minister, Benazir Bhutto, during the last general-election campaign.
The US agreed to Baitullah's assassination for two reasons. One was that the TeT in its offensive, after initial Pakistan encouragement to its Islamist activities in Swat Valley, reached within striking distance of Islamabad, provoking fears of the stability of the Pakistan state, and inciting anxieties about the security of its nuclear weapons. The second reason was that Pakistan alleged close ties between the TeT and the Al-Qaeda/ Afghan Taliban/ Haqqani network, and urged Baitullah's murder to break the linkage.
Obviously, Pakistan was pursuing its own agenda. There is no reason to disbelieve that Baitullah was not close to the Al-Qaeda and Afghan Taliban leadership, but he wasn't the Al-Qaeda, and he certainly wasn't as threatening to US interests as Osama Bin Laden and the others. But Baitullah was a more immediate threat to Pakistan, and so Pakistan exaggerated the threats from his Al-Qaeda connections to the US.
This writer had written about this exaggeration, as had presumably others, but Baitullah went down anyhow, and since then, the Pakistan army has claimed military successes against the TeT in South Waziristan. To avenge Baitullah's death, his successor apparently arranged a Jordanian suicide bomber, claiming to have knowledge about the Al-Qaeda leadership, to kill several CIA agents at their secret base in Afghanistan. In turn to revenge that killing, the US droned Hakimullah.
So far so good. Now the Pakistan army spokesperson says TeT is suing for talks, but that there would be no dialogue until its leadership lays down arms. This cancer of terrorism, said the army spokesperson, would be eradicated completely from Pakistan. He said this while responding to questions about Hakimullah's death, which he wouldn't confirm. But in the absence of contrary evidence, it does appear that the TeT chief is no more. Pakistani news reports have commenced identifying his likely successors.
The point is this. If the Pakistan army, according to its own boast, can roll up the TeT or Pakistan Taliban with US assistance, why can't it go after the Al-Qaeda/ Afghan Taliban/ Haqqani network? The Pakistan army claims its campaign in South Waziristan is more or less over. In which case, it can now turn its attention to the Al-Qaeda and others. And the anti-TeT campaign will give it the necessary morale-boost and combat tactics to take on the international terrorists hiding in North Waziristan and Quetta.
So why isn't it doing so? Because nobody, but especially the US, has made the connection, and the consequent demand. The Obama administration must pause at the defeatist course taken at the London conference and hammer the Pakistan army to replicate its successes against the TeT with the Al-Qaeda/ Afghan Taliban/ Haqqani network.
Can the successes be replicated? Absolutely. The Pakistan army took greater risks attacking the TeT, because it held the potential (as it still does) of splitting the military along Pushtun-Punjabi lines. There was also the risk that the TeT backlash with suicide bombings could grow uncontained. And few visualized that the TeT would be able to win adherents within Punjab, who styled themselves as the Punjabi Taliban. With all these risks, the Pakistan military took on the Pakistani Taliban both moved by internal-security considerations and US pressure.
Compared to the TeT, there are fewer risks associated with taking on the Al-Qaeda and others, especially since they are pivotally dependant on ISI-provided logistics' support. It is obvious that the Al-Qaeda will authorize assassinations chiefly of Pakistan's political and military leaderships to stop the campaign, but Pakistan, in view of the TeT offensive (no pun intended), is already well-secured against targeted assassinations.
On its own, Pakistan won't act against the Al-Qaeda and Afghan Taliban. The reasons are too well known to be repeated, and they intimately concern India. President Barack Obama must have to take the initiative and bring pressure on Pakistan to take on the terrorists. If Obama dares Osama and wins, his declining presidency will gain a second life and coast him to an easy re-election. All his poor delivery record on the economy, unemployment, healthcare reforms, etc, will be forgotten.
The London Afghanistan conference plan of diving and defeating the Taliban will fail. The death of Hakimullah shows the real way to bring peace to Afghanistan by routing the Al-Qaeda and Afghan Taliban. Act up, America.
N.V.Subramanian is Editor, www.NewsInsight.net, and writes internationally on strategic affairs. He has authored two novels, University of Love (Writers Workshop, Calcutta) and Courtesan of Storms (Har-Anand, Delhi).
Please visit N.V.Subramanian's blog http://courtesanofstorms.blog.com/ and write to him at envysub@gmail.com
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